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WE WANT SCIENCE AND MORE THAN SCIENCE*
BY W. STEWART ROSS.
PREF.\TORY EXPLANATION BV THE EDITOR.
The present article will be interesting to our readers
as it presents a friendly criticism of some of the fun-
damental tenets of The Open Court. It is the sub-
stance of an after-dinner speech by Mr. Stewart Ross.
He replied to Dr. Carus, who finished his speech with
the following sentences :
"What, then, is this unknowable? If the know-
" able is everything that impresses us, is the unknow-
"able that which does not impress us? Do you mean
" it may be knowable on some distant planet, but not
" here ? No, that is not the Agnostic sense of the term.
"As a matter of fact, I believe the Agnostic simply
"means that the world is wonderful. Professor Jodl
"of Prague, a friend of mine, says, 'there is a differ-
"ence between philosophical knowledge and scientific
" knowledge ; scientific knowledge includes everything
" representable or describable ; but,' he says, 'philo-
" sophical knowledge is something more.' I requested
"a definition of philosophical knowledge, but- he has
"not as yet given one. To my mind knowledge is
"knowledge, and there is none but scientific knowl-
" edge ; and philosophy, being the science of science,
"is that which investigates the methods of science,
"summing up at the same time the results of the
"sciences in a systematic world-conception. My mind
"has no nook in it for the unknowable. Our knowl-
"edge is small indeed, but whatever is representable
" is knowable.
"The Chairman, I know, is in special disagree-
"ment with me. He has, perhaps, a stronger vein
" for mysticism than I ; and I should like to hear him
"on mysticism. "t
MR. ROSS'S SPEECH.
Dr. Carus seems to take up the position that phi-
losophy has no status apart from physical science. I
agree with the Prague Professor that it has. Now, I
would suggest that philosophy has made very little
* Reprinted from Mr. Gould's article " An Evening with Dr. Carus," Part
III, Agnostic Journal XXXI, No. 17, pp. 258-259.
t Quoted with slight alterations from Mr. Gould's report in The Agnostic
yournaL
progress during the last two thousand years—the Ba-
conian system, if applied exclusively, implying a quite
unphilosophical limitation—while science has made
gigantic strides. I ask, then, if philosophy be de-
pendent upon science
—
physical and applied science,
as generally understood—where was the science when
Socrates taught, and Plato elucidated, and Aristotle
propounded, the philosophy which dominated Chris-
tendom for ages? Natural science, at that time, was
practically unknown, though some initial steps had
been taken with regard to electricity and steam-power.
But philosophy then, as always, was an attempt, like
that of our friend's monism, to unify the world-system
and furnish a thinkable theory of being ; and such at-
tempts have been made from the very initiation of hu-
man speculation and reasoning. And I am not sure
that our progress in physical science has added one
jot or tittle to the grist and material for the philosophic
mill.
Then with regard to theology. Theology, we are
told, is "reasoned religion." Now, I object that re-
ligion, as distinguished from ethics, cannot be rea-
soned. Religion, I submit, cannot be reasoned. I
hold that, after reason has been pushed, as it should
be, to the remotest limit and uttermost boundary to
which it will extend, all your cravings and aspirations
are not satisfied. And there theology has stepped in
to fill the vacuum, the lacunee, which nothing else
could. Theology has been prostituted for class and
imperial and pontifical interests ; but no student of
history can deny that it has been indispensable to man-
kind, because it dealt with a region which reason could
not touch, but which, all the same, was indicated by
man's irrepressible convictions.
Let us glance a moment at the science of which
Dr. Carus speaks—science based on actual demonstra-
tion. Well, this science treats of atoms ; but the Doc-
tor will admit that what the atom is we do not know.
It is not demonstrable, only hypothetical. Yet he uses
the term, and has a definite idea of what he regards as
the atom ; and without its postulation he cannot pro-
ceed. He will speak of so many atoms combining to
make a molecule of this or that, while all the time he
cannot prove to demonstration the existence of the
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atom. Even his vaunted science itself, at its very base,
is no more demonstrable than the beliefs inherent in
the religious instinct.
Where science and philosophy break down we re-
quire religion. We do not, however, require a dog-
matic theology. I deny that there can be such a science.
I deny that an exact theological science can be pro-
pounded.* Our conception of the theos, or of infinity
our reaching to that which lies beyond the scope- of
science—can never be formulated and codified. Never-
theless, it may be the subject-matter of psychic aspi-
ration and experience. Not only do spiritualists and
theosophists use the term psychic science, but there
are many philosophers and scientists not belonging to
those schools who believe such science has a legitimate
place in education and moral and intellectual develop-
ment. Now, the monism of Dr. Carus would exclude
this field of aspirational experience from the scope of
philosophy ; and, therefore, I cannot accept our friend's
monism.
Yet, in a sense, I am a monist. I believe in the
one-ness—in the at-one-vient— of the universe. I be-
lieve that the world is one. But it takes very much
to make a world—much which the monism of Dr. Carus
would exclude. He would exclude everything which
is not demonstrable in scientific propositions—every-
thing which does not appeal to the five senses, and ap-
prove itself to the sensational school. I ask him, as a
biologist, as an embryologist, whether we have ahvays
had five senses ? Once our ancestors had them in an
incipient state only. Where, then, will he put an end
to the process of evolution ? May not a sixth sense be
at present in the stage of inception in some advanced
souls ? Such souls, in flights which others perhaps
regard as mental aberrations, may soar beyond the
bounds of physical science. Is not the region they soar
to, a legitimate sphere for mankind ? Has not religion,
in past ages, catered to that sense ? It has, indeed,
* This has reference to the following sentences in Dr. Carus's speech
:
" Mr, Holyoake has been speaking on secularism, and he allowed that it
was sometimes used to mean anti-theology. I think, as he does, that it should
imply something more than that. The term secularism has a great advantage
in being positive, while anti-theology is a mere negation. Secularism is good
because it deals with life on human principles alone, and theology is bad so
long as it deals with things on a supernatural basis. There is a theology,
however, now growing up which has a secular character. It takes a monistic
view of religion and of the world. Some of the greatest minds among theo-
logians are joining this movement. I may mention Professor Holtzmann, of
Strasbourg, the author of what I consider the best work on the New Testa-
ment, embodying the research and scholarship of several centuries. I am
glad to note that he is positively secular in his views, and I find myself more
in accord with a theologian than I ever expected to be. Secularism, I repeat,
is not anti-theology. It is, in fact, a higher kind of theology. It is monistic
theology, and it developes religious conceptions to a higher level.
" We have all of us, gentlemen, said many a harsh word about theology,
and set up an opposition between theology and religion, arguing that religion
shoud be accepted, but theology repudiated. To some extent this opposition
is wrong. Theology, in the best sense, means reasoned religion. When I
discuss, in philosophical language, with a theologian,—a philosophically
trained professor of theology,— I find myself able to come to terms with him
better tha.n with a parson, i. e., an orthodox pulpiteer without a philosophical
education. The philosophically trained theologian will soon confess that by
God he does not mean a person."
often degraded the people rather than elevated them,
owing to the ignorance, or worse, of the hierophants.
But, while I admit that, I affirm that religion has had
a distinct part to play in the economy of human nature.
I can accept no system which will preclude the specu-
lations of the religious instinct. Human nature is not
a simple, but an exceedingly complex, factor. My
friend on my right (Mr. Holyoake) has laid down an
excellent code of action and ethics for it, as far as the
problems of merely concrete mundanism are concerned.
His doctrine is good as far as it goes ; but it does not
cover the whole field. Of course we cannot get above
and outside what he calls " this-worldism " or "one-
world-at-a-timeism " ; but then this world is, in its
principles and potencies, so vast that there is very
much of which merely secularistic this-worldism takes
no cognisance. The religionists, the pietists, are of
this world, and, therefore, religion is a thing of this
world ; aye, and as legitimate a thing of this world as
is anything else that is in it. To us, as Dr. Lewins
pertinently maintains after Protagoras the Abderite,
there is no world for any one of us except that which
each one of us makes for himself. Ei-go, it is vain to
speak of this-worldism where no other worldism is
possible ; there is, as Dr. Carus justly contends, Mo-
iiisiii, one world only ; in spite of the evidence of phe-
nomena as to heterogeneity, there is in reality only
homogeneity, monism, one entity, one existence ; and
the true perception of this oneness, in spite of the able
advocacy of Dr. Carus to the contrary, is likelier to
yield its secret to those who search for it on what are
called psychic, than to those who go in quest of it on
what are called physical, lines ; although, of course,
in the final analysis, psychic and physical are one. It
is important to know what nature docs: to codify what
it does is the special effort of my friend. Dr. Carus.
To me it seems more important still to know what na-
ture is, and to attempt, it may be vainly, to adumbrate
a higher science that, besides embracing chemistry,
biology, and geology, shall include religion, eschatol-
ogy, and ontology, and found monism, not on the ex-
clusion of anything, but on the inclusion of everything.
RELIGION, THE LOVE OF TRUTH AND THE APPLICA-
TION OF TRUTH.
The philosophical gathering which a few friends
in England kindly convened in my honor shortly be-
fore I returned to my Western home beyond the At-
lantic, was indeed a rare and unusual feast. Vigorous
and fearless thinkers were present. The after-dinner
speeches were lively, interesting, and instructive. Yet
the most extraordinary feature of this congenial com-
pany, it seems to me, was the fact that contrary opin-
ions were presented without producing the slightest
jar. Offence was neither given nor taken, and all the
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many differences of opinion blended like the seven
colors of the spectrum into one harmonious conversa-
tion, such as took place in Plato's symposium, in which
the different aspects of the same truth are represented
by various speakers, apparently combating one an-
other but really all working and aspiring toward one
goal.
Mr. F. J. Gould wrote an account of this note-
worthy evening and we quote from it in the present
number a speech which contains a few terse criticisms
of the tenets upheld by The Open Court. It is the
speech of Mr. W. Stewart Ross, the gifted editor of
The Agnostic Journal, well known as a forcible writer
under the nom deplume of Saladin.
One of the friends present had previously asked me
the following question :
"As to Spencerian agnosticism take, as an axample, the phe-
nomena of water, its solid forms (ice, snow, hail) etc. ; its liquid
forms (sea, river, rain, cloud, etc.); its gaseous form, invisible;
its constituent gases, hydrogen and oxygen, which are hypothetic-
ally resolvable into atoms. Does not all this impress us with the
existence of a mysterious unknowable manifesting itself in the
many forms. Even agnosticism would admit that the unreachable
essence and its reachable manifestations are united in the ALL,
but thinks that our sense of inability to grasp the idea of the pri-
mary yaisoii d'etre of phenomena is best expressed by speaking of
the absolute. How would you meet this ?"
My answer was : I should meet it by the coun-
ter question. What do you understand by knowledge ?
My answer to this question will explain why from my
standpoint the idea of anything unknowable cannot be
admitted. Knowledge is representation ; knowledge
is simply a description of facts. A phenomenon, which
is appropriately represented in the sentient symbols of
a mind called ideas, is said to be known. Cognition
or comprehension is the unification of knowledge. We
understand a phenomenon as soon as we recognise it
as a special case of other phenomena with which we
are familiar. Accordingly, everything that affects us
somehow, can be known ; it can be represented in
mental symbols. Unknowable is only that which can
never affect sentient beings, neither directly nor indi-
rectly, which can never exercise any influence upon
them ; and incomprehensible is that which we have to
give up all hope of harmonising with the systematised
body of our experiences. I admit that facts are won-
derful, but I do not call them unknowable.
I had an interesting correspondence with a friend of
mine. Professor Jodl in Prague, who maintains that
there are two kinds of knowledge, (i) scientific knowl-
edge, which is a description and a unification of facts,
and (2) philosophical knowledge. What the latter is,
I cannot tell. Professor Jodl has not as yet defined the
term and I am unable to supply a definition.
I cannot accept a duality of knowledge. There is
but one knowledge and that is scientific knowledge ;
there is but one method of cognition and that is the
same for both science and philosophy. The proposi
tion of a duality of knowledge must infallibly lead to
mysticism. There are two kinds of mysticism : one
is the religious mysticism which finds the right ethics
instinctively even before science has investigated the
ethical problem ; the other is that which trusts that
there is a special kind of knowledge different from
scientific knowledge. The former, mysticism was a
forerunner of modern monism, the latter is at bottom
a dualism. Monism is not antagonistic to the former,
but it rejects the latter.
Mr. Ross is a mystic, and says Mr. Gould in his
report :
"The concluding sentiment of Dr. Carus's address kindled the
light of controversy in the eyes of Saladin, and he rose to tender
briefly (for the hour was late) his friendly comments."
We have reprinted Saladin's speech, as it appears
in a late number of The Agnostic Journal, in full, be-
cause it deserves our full attention. And having prom-
ised to give a further explanation of the subject, it
would not be fair to state our reply without at the same
time publishing the statement of Mr. Ross.
Saladin says :
"Dr. Cams seems to take up the position that philosophy has
no status apart from physical science. I agree with the Prague
Professor that it has."
While I said that there are not two, but only one
kind of knowledge, I would at the same time declare
that philosophy has a status apart not only from phys-
ical but also from psychical science. Philosophy is
not merely as we are told by the French positivists, a
hierarchy of the sciences
;
philosophy has a domain of
her own. Philosophy is the science of the sciences ;
it investigates the methods of science ; it inquires into
the objective and subjective conditions of cognition ;
it states the aim and purpose of science, and gathering
the rich harvest from the fields of scientists constructs
out of their results a world-conception. That is not
all. Having mapped out a world-conception philoso-
phy determines man's place in nature and derives
therefrom the rules of his conduct. Such is briefly
sketched the field of philosophy—a large field indeed.
Saladin says that " Philosophy has made very little
progress during the last two thousand years." I ven-
ture to differ. We might say with Kant of metaphys-
ics, that it has made no progress, but not of philoso-
phy. The progress of philosophy has been so great,
and even to-day its strides are so gigantic, that it is
difficult even for a philosopher by profession to keep
up with it ; and the whole province is breaking up into
various sub-departments of research. There are phi-
losophers now working in one field only, say, in ethics,
in the theory of cognition or in methodology.
We cannot say that natural science was unknown
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to Aristotle. Aristotle was a first class naturalist.
Familiarity with the results of science is less important
to a philosopher than to be versed in the methods of
inquiry. Yet who would deny the great influence of
natural science upon Aristotle's philosophy, and must
we not deplore the lack of it. in the period of scholas-
ticism ?
By the bye, philosophy is in my opinion not de-
pendent upon natural science. I should rather say
the reverse. Natural science is dependent upon phi-
losophy; for philosophy discusses the fundamental
problems of scientific inquiry; philosophy manufactures
the implements of scientific inquiry. But philosophy
prospers only when in closest contact with science.
What manufacturer would dream of making certain
implements if they were not in demand ! Thus while
philosophy quickens science and vice versa, science
quickens philosophy. Philosophy and the sciences
form one great interacting organism.
Socrates was the founder of ethics ; he neglected
all other branches of philosophy and limited himself
to inquiries into the rules of conduct. Socrates is a
great man as a character and moral teacher. He lived
and died as he preached, so that he can justly be com-
pared with Confucius, Buddha, and even to Jesus of
Nazareth. But aside from his ethics we should hardly,
for his other philosophical achievements, range him so
high.
Now we approach the main point. Saladin says :
"Where science and philosophy break down, we require re-
ligion."
Here I must respectfully differ. Yet I must state
at once that I do by no means underrate the strength
of Saladin's proposition. I have been on the other
side of the fence also, and in attacking his position, I
am attacking a former self of mine. Desirous to let the
reader judge for himself, I quote two mottoes of 77?^
Agnostic Journal which prove that there are very great
authorities cherishing the same view.
, Says Max Miiller :
"There is in man a third faculty, which I call simply the
faculty of apprehending the Infinite, not only in religion, but in
all things ; a power independent of sense and reason, a power in a
certain sense contradicted by sense and reason, and yet a very real
power, which has held its own from the beginning of the world,
neither sense nor reason being able to overcome it, while it alone
is able to overcome both reason and sense."
More valuable still are the following words because
coming from the pen of a prominent scientist; Profes-
sor Tyndall says :
"Man can no more now, than in the days of Job, by search-
ing find out what this power is whose garments are seen in the
visible universe."
That All-existence of which we are parts is indeed
a wondrous power. Its immensity is no less over-
whelming than the marvels which we encounter when
laboriously entering into the realms of the infinitely
small. Wherever we touch it, existence is great
;
wherever we inquire into the laws of being, we find
portentous wonders, which are certainly no less won-
derful for the fact that they are intelligible. On the
contrary, the intelligibility of the world is its most
striking feature, which is even more stupendous when
we learn to understand that intelligibility is a strikingly
simple fact, which cannot be otherwise than it is, and
the problem of the universality of law is the same as
the problem why one plus one will always make two.
But all this granted, we cannot contradict our-
selves, and say this all-existence which is so wonderful
because it is intelligible, is at the same time so unin-
telligibly mysterious that we know nothing about it,
and cannot know anything about it. Prof. Tyndall
says, "Its garments only are seen." Without discuss-
ing the propriety or impropriety of the allegory, which
introduces an unjustifiable duality of garment and of
the person clothed in the garment, we should say that
this garment indeed must be a close fitting jersey; and
if it were not, if God were so radically out of contact
with the world, that no inference were allowable from
the creation to the creator, our reality would be the
garment and not the unapproachable God so loosely
vested in it. If we are not and can never come in
contact with God, his existence would to us be tanta-
mount to non-existence. There are some savage tribes
taking this view. They say: "We know that God
exists, but he is too big for us ; he is too great to mind
us ; he is far away above the skies and would not hear
our prayer." God in my opinion is the reality that
surrounds us and of which our very being consists.
We are in constant contact with him, for it is He in
whom we live and move and have our being. Thus it
is not true that man can no more now than in the days
of Job, by searching find out what this power is "of
which we are parts." We do find out more about God
by searching, and we do know more about him than
did the great author of this grandest of poems, the book
of Job.
The world is grand and wonderful, but whatever
exists manifests its existence ; it acts and reacts upon
other existences. It affects them and forms a factor
in the interacting totality of the whole. In its actions
it is describable and cognisable. Even the infinite is a
conception which is as plain or even plainer than any-
thing finite. Ask a mathematician whether man pos-
sesses besides sense and reason a third faculty, "the
faculty of apprehending the infinite." The mathe-
matician will inform you that reason is quite sufficient
to understand the nature of the infinite; and that if
such a third faculty existed its reality should be doubted
if indeed it were in a certain sense contradicted by
sense and reason. If reason were contradicted by
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sense, or sense by reason, in what a sorry plight would
science be? If Max Miiller's statement had to be ac-
cepted, agnosticism would indeed be justified to stop
philosophical and scientific and also religious progress
by the sad cry " Ignorabimus ! "
I recollect that Mr. Ross said in his speech some-
thing to the effect that he would be the last to cripple
reason or to limit its range. I cannot find the sentence
in Mr. Gould's report. Is my recollection mistaken,
or was the sentence dropped because it appears con-
tradictory to the passage in which Mr. Ross speaks of
"the region which reason ' cannot touch"? I was
eagerly looking for the sentence concerning the un-
limited range of reason, not because it appeared to me
contradictory to the other sentence concerning the
region which reason cannot touch, but because both
sentences might satisfactorily interpret the one the
other. For a satisfactory interpretation—satisfactory
to me from the standpoint I take—of the view defended
by Mr. Ross and endorsed by the quotations from Max
Miiller and Tyndall is possible. I should not budge
from the proposition that everything real is describable
and cognisable ; but am willing to make a concession
which might be deemed satisfactory to at least some
partisans of mysticism.
How does science describe? It reduces the un-
known to terms of the known. Thus the whole uni-
verse is interpreted by our own existence ; and the
elementary quality of our own existence is feeling.
Our senses paint the world in the glowing life of sen-
sations, while reason constructs from these data a
world-picture.
Mr. Ross mistakes my position when he says that
I "would exclude .... everything which does not ap-
peal to the five senses and approve itself, to the sensa-
tional school." Mathematics is a science from which
all sense elements have been excluded, and logical ar-
guments appeal to reason, not to the five senses. Un-
willing to exclude the formal sciences I do not regard
The Open Court philosophy as belonging to the sensa-
tional school. The sensational school being unable to
explain causation from sensational data alone was the
very philosophy which naturally developed into agnos-
ticism and mysticism, for Hume, Mill, and Spencer be-
long together. Reason is a mystery to the sensation-
alist.
What is reason? Is reason a mysterious faculty?
Reason, like the world-order, is most wonderful, but
it is not mysterious. On the contrary, it is that which
solves the mysteries of the world. The world-order
is due to the omnipresence of form and to the univer-
sality of the laws of form. Reason, however, is the
image of the form of existence ; reason is formal
thought. Logic, arithmetic, mathematics, are formal
ciences. Logic is the science of the formal laws of
thinking, and reason is that faculty which performs
logical, arithmetical, mathematical and other opera-
tions upon the basis of the laws of form. Reason,
accordingly, is as little mysterious as light is dark.
Wherever light penetrates, darkness ceases, and wher-
ever reason analyses nature, the mysteries of existence
vanish.
We have five senses, and Saladin justly claims that
in former periods of evolution we had less, and that in
the future we might have more. We might acquire
an electric sense, or some organ to become aware of
natural phenomena the very existence of which is still
hidden to us. I do not venture to contradict, but it
appears to me that it would matter but little so long
as our reason would remain the same. Yet, although
I grant that man might become in possession of more
than five or six senses, I maintain that he cannot ac-
quire another kind of reason. There are different kinds
of sense, but there is but one reason. Reason traces
the form of the universe, and with the help of the laws
of form, the world is described not in the subjective
elements of feelings but in the objective elements of
measurable relations. In this way reason frees us from
the fetters of sense and becomes, as it were, the organ
of constructing objectivity.
What are the elements of which reason constructs
its world-picture ? That quality which is common to
all sensations is feeling or awareness. Ajre feelings
perhaps mysterious, or incomprehensible, or unknow-
able ? No they are not ; for they are exactly that which
is best known. Our feelings are the data of knowl-
edge ; and all knowledge is based upon them. But
while our feelings are not unknown or unknowable,
they are to the cognising subject ultimate. Being the
terms in which we describe, we can describe one only
by comparing it with another, and have always to fall
back upon them as that which is immediately given
in experience. In this sense the realm of feeling forms
a department which reason does not touch. Reason
handles the different feelings, the sensations of smell,
of taste, of touch, of sight, and of hearing : but it does
not make them. It uses them as building-stones, but
it does not create them. Reason need not create them,
for they are the given element of experience, but with-
out them reason could never construct a world-con-
ception. Pure reason can raise lofty structures of pure
forms, systems of mathematical, algebraical, or logical
symbols. But these systems are emptier than air-
castles. They are evacuate forms without substance.
The data of sentiency only can fill them with reality
and give color to their pale forms.
If by religion is to be understood the unspecified
yearning that animates the soul, I grant that reason
cannot produce it. Physics teaches us that a mutual
attraction resides in all particles of mass that consti-
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tute the sum total of matter in the universe, and an
introspection into the life of our self reveals to us that
our feelings in an analogous way aspire to something :
our soul consists of yearnings. How often are we mis-
taken in our desires, hopes, and longings ! As soon
as we reach that which we thought we were eagerly
seeking, we feel disappointed, for we find out that we
desired something better, greater, and nobler.
The ultimate aim in which all feelings may be rep-
resented to find satisfaction, may be sought in infinity
it may be called God orTheos, it may be characterised
as an illusion or an ideal, that much is certain that the
elements of our soul, the feelings out of which the hu-
man mind grows, are yearnings. Reason does not
create these yearnings ; they are facts ; they are the
data of our soul-life.
There is a truth in Saladin's position which I do
not wish to deny, and there is a truth too in the sen-
tences quoted from Max Miiller and from Tyndall
;
but I should express it differently. I should say : The
religious sentiment is now the same as it was in the
days of Job ; we feel attracted by a power that, mys-
tically speaking, loves us with an everlasting love and
therefore with loving kindness is drawing us. The
yearning of our soul, which is unlimited, unfathom-
able, infinite, is a power "independent of sense and
reason," and "neither sense nor reason are able to
overcome .it, while it alone is able to overcome both
reason and sense." For this yearning is the master,
sense and reason are his servants. Sense and reason
stand in the service of the will. They are his torch
bearers and illumine his path.
Monism, as it is upheld in The Open Court, does
not exclude the sacred promptings of the religious in-
stinct ; on the contrary, it includes them ; nay, more
so, The Open Court is the work of these promptings.
The founder of The Open Court, in spite of all the ac-
cusations of narrow-minded bigots who call him a
pagan and an infidel, because he carries the torch of
reason into the dark chambers of religious dogmatism,
is of a deeply religious nature.
The religion of The Open Court, however, (mine no
less than Mr. Hegeler's,) does not originate in the
breakdown of science and philosophy, but it permeates
and is permeated by science and philosophy. The more
science we have, the purer, the grander, the truer will
be our religion. If science and philosophy should
break down, our religion would break down with them.
Science and philosophy are inseparable from religion,
and religion could not exist without them.
In conclusion of my reply to Mr. Ross, I repeat
what I said in London at the banquet table : My ag-
nostic friends may agree with Tlie Open Court's monism
more than might at first seem probable, if we could
come to a closer understanding of our fundamental
terms." The gist of Saladin's speech expresses the
sentiment : We want more than science, we want re-
ligion. And this finds a ready echo in my heart. Science
alone cannot save ; we must have religion. But we de-
mand that religion should be in agreement with science.
Science is the search for truth, and religion is the love
of truth and the application of truth. We want more
than science ; we want the application of science, we
want more than a cold statement of facts; truth alone
is not enough ; we want feeling also ; we want the re-
ligious sentiment, the love of truth, the enthusiasm of
right, of duty, of the ideal. P. c.
CURRENT TOPICS.
The problem of an extra session is not yet solved, although
all the newspapers in the country have been guessing at it ever
since the election ; and if an incident far away from the main
subject may be in order by way of illustration, I will mention it.
About fifteen years ago, a Deputy Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, with whom I had some official relations, died ; and a friend,
who was himself an officer of high rank in the Bureau, spoke thus
of the misfortune to me ; ' ' This is a great loss ; Tom was the only
man in the Department who knew anything about the business,
and tie didn't." It seems that Mr. Cleveland is the only man in
the country who knows whether there will be an extra session or
not, and lie doesn't know. To clear this mystery, the New York
Herald put the following question to every member of the new
Congress, " Are you in favor of an extra session or not ? " Seventy-
two members answered. Yes ; seventy-eight said. No ; and twenty-
eight were like the accommodating juryman, ready to go on either
side. One hundred and sixty-eight made no answer ; and a large
majority of these, contrary to the old maxim that silence gives
consent, must be counted in the negative. Unfortunately, the
Herald went for information to the wrong place ; and the testimony
it offers is worthless either as a sign of public opinion or as a de-
claration of the President's duty. The Herald says to three hun-
dred and fifty-six hired men, "Your wages will go on for nine
months whether you work or play ; now, which would you rather
do ? " Although the answers are not all that they ought to be, they
offer gratifying evidence that political honesty is increasing in this
land, for no less than seventy-two of the hired men declare them-
selves willing to work for the wages they receive. Seventy-two out
of a total of three hundred and fifty-six is very encouraging. The
witnesses offered by the Herald are parties interested in the ver-
dict ; and these at common law were not permitted to testify. It is
true that the old rule has been modified in England ; and in most
of the American states the testimony of interested parties is now
accepted ; but it is always under the shadow of legal suspicion,
and therefore weak. It is to the advantage of members that an
extra session shall not be, and they will prevent it if they can.
*
1. *
If the New York Herald had expanded its political catechism,
and had asked those members who are opposed to an extra session,
whether or not they are in favor of drawing pay for their idle
time, the answer would have been unanimously in the affirmative.
With patriotic punctuality they will begin drawing pay on the 4th
of March, at 12 o'clock, sharp ; but they will not meet for business
until the following December, and then only just in time to ad-
journ over for the holidays. When they reassemble they will adopt
stringent rules for limiting debate, so as to save the precious public
time. For the first nine months of the term they will do nothing;
but for the last nine hours of it they will work with dangerous ve-
locity ; and at the very end, they will steal nine minutes from the
future by the puerile trick, always theatrically done, of putting
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back the hands of the congressional clock. In those moribund
hours, the most important legislation of the term is done ; and it
is done without either deliberation or dignity ; yet the men who
are so conscientiously industrious at the end, will publicly declare
that they ought not to do anything at all for nine months at the
beginning. Members of congress draw two year's pay for one year's
work, and they insist upon having a holiday half the time even if
they have to steal it. Already opposing partisans are throwing
upon one another the "responsibility" for a possible special ses-
sion of Congress, as if a meeting of the people's elected represen-
tatives were a calamity. When members of congress declare that
they ought not to be allowed to meet for nine months after their
term of office begins, and not until thirteen months after their elec-
tion, they throw suspicion upon themselves, and proclaim that the
prospect of their coming together in legislative session is a menace
to the republic. What honest objection can there ever be to a
meeting of the chosen representatives of the people ? Is a meeting
of delegates charged with a direct message from the people to be
regarded as dangerous to the commonwealth ? If so, let us abolish
the republic, and like the fools of Israel advertise for a king. The
people at the late election decided, not for a change of masters,
but for a change of servants, and the right to be put into immediate
possession of their own.
Whenever a free people, or a people nominally free, become
jealous of the republican element in their political constitution, it
is a sign that the legislature is corrupt, or else that the people
themselves are not in robust moral health. When they get into
that sickly mood, they are sure to call for help upon the royal and
imperial powers latent in their organic law. They appeal to the
chief magistrate for protection against themselves and their own
representatives. We, the people of the United States, appear to
be in that morbid condition at this time. We are praying for des-
potic rule, and clinging to a hope that somehow or other Mr. Cleve-
land will magnanimously save us from the House of Representa-
tives, the only republican element in the government ; the only part
of it that is directly appointed by general ballot, and made imme-
diately responsible to the people. Feeling that we are not polit-
ically well, we dose ourselves with quack physic, and experiment
in a shiftless way with every magic drug that promises relief. For
instance, here is a scheme of imperial coercion recommended to
Mr. Cleveland by a man of national reputation as a lawyer, a po-
litical economist, and a social reformer, Mr. Thomas G. Shearman
of New York. I present it on the authority of the iV^uis Record,
which gives the story " for what it is worth," a suspicious apology
which implies that it is not worth very much, and that Mr, Shear-
man may be innocent after all ; but here is the story : ' ' Mr. Shear-
man's recommendation as reported is that almost immediately af-
ter Mr. Cleveland's inauguration he shall summon Congress in
special session and shall give the members of his party to under-
stand that no appointments whatever will be made by him until a
tariff bill shall have passed both houses." This plan of punishing
legislative disobedience to the royal will has one transcendent merit,
it is a scheme of ingenious torture, the most effectual that could
possibly be devised ; but unfortunately, it is prohibited by the con-
stitution in that section which declares that cruel and unusual pun-
ishments shall not be inflicted. Surely nothing could be more
tantalising and cruel than to withhold from victorious Democrats
the offices they have won by the sweat of their honest brows. If
Mr. Cleveland will flourish that whip over the Democrats in Con-
gress and give it a few snaps after the manner of the ring master
in the circus, they will surrender unconditionally, and allow him
to dictate the laws.
* *
Lord Beaconsfield said on one occasion that history is a record
of political action and reaction ; and in this he was very nearly
right. At the close of the eighteenth century, theoretical democracy
had reached its highest development in the United States of Amer-
ica ; but at the close of the nineteenth century, we behold a strong
reaction here against the spirit of democracy and the substance
too. The recommendation of Mr. Shearman, if he ever made it,
that the President use the offices to influence Congress, means a
reaction toward the system that aided Walpole to govern England:
a judicious distribution of offices and patronage among the mem-
bers of parliament in both houses. Walpole employed those means,
not because he was himself corrupt, but because he lived in a li-
centious age ; and because the men he wanted were for sale. He
is charged with saying, " Every man has his price," and although
he probably never said it, the testimony of history shows that he
might have said it when he was prime minister without much ex-
aggeration. Mr, Shearman's advice to the President, if adopted,
would carry us backward even to the rear of Walpole's adminis-
tration ; to the time of James, and Charles, and Elizabeth, when
the sovereign used to reprimand the House of Commons as a
schoolmaster lectures disobedient boys. Nor is the plan of Mr.
Shearman the only sign of a reaction in this country toward king-
ship and arbitrary power. Other men are advocating a like prin-
ciple for a reason antagonistic to that which animates Mr. Shear-
man. He wants the President to coerce Congress in behalf of
tariff reform ; while the others, fearful of reform, advise the Pres-
ident not to convene the legislature except upon condition that the
Democrats promise to do nothing but appoint the committees, vote
the supplies, and then go home. Either way is an assault upon
the independence of Congress, the superior authority, and the peo-
ple's part of the government. Any such kingly interference is an
encroachment upon liberty, and a usurpation. " The United States
of America in Congress assembled," is a phrase not meant for
sonorous rhetoric ; it expresses the law, and it excludes the Presi-
dent from the domain of legislation, excepting that he has a quali-
fied and limited veto. Relatively, the prerogatives of the President
ought to be decreased, while those of Congress ought to be en-
larged, especially the powers of the House of Representatives. In
the language of a parliamentary resolution memorable in English
history, "The power of the crown has increased, is increasing,
and ought to be diminished."
*
* *
By reading a late number of that very interesting and superior
paper, the Newcastle Weekly Chronicle, I learn that a new holy day
has been consecrated in England and put into the sacred calendar
of hard labor. The curious but expressive name of it is "Museum
Sunday," and it seems to be the Sunday nearest to the sixth day
of November in each year ; "for it was on that day a year ago."
says the Chronicle, "that the Sunday Society secured its object in
London—the opening of museums, art galleries, and libraries to
the public on Sundays." The explanation is bewildering until we
get accustomed to it, because the Sunday Society in America is de-
voted to the work of shutting up museums, art galleries, libraries,
and all such depraved and idle places on the blessed Sabbath day.
Statues, pictures, books, specimen wonders in geology, or zoology,
and the triumphs of ingenious mechanism are all well enough on
Mondays or on Tuesdays, for then their influence is educational
and moral, but on Sundays it is demoralising and profane. On
Sundays an art gallery must be made a cloister or a tomb. " Sev-
enty-two museums, art galleries, and libraries," we are told, "are
now opened on the Sabbath in different parts of England ; and be-
fore the next anniversary comes round the number will doubtless
be increased." This is a great achievement ; and we are informed
also that, " For some time past the Sunday opening of these places
of culture and recreation has engaged the attention of social agita-
tors." I cannot help asking, where were the men of " culture" all
this time? Why was the work of opening "places of culture " on
Sundays left to "social agitators," who seem to be the persecuted
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pioneers o£ every improvement in the social state ? Straggling
along as usual among the camp followers, come the clergy, to
patronise Museum Sunday now, for we are told that " the move-
ment finds many sympathisers among pulpit lights, favorable ref-
erences being made to the new anniversary last Sunday by the
Rev. Canon Shuttleworth, the Rev. H. R. Haweis, and Mr. Mon-
cure D. Conway." Very well ; we ought to be grateful for this
little contribution ; here are two divines out of hundreds, and al-
though Mr. Conway is a very brilliant light in literature and in so-
cial science, he has not been a "pulpit light" in the orthodox
meaning of the phrase for many years. I am grateful even for
their late support ; but where were those ' ' pulpit lights " when they
were needed in the fog ? Where were they when men through a
haze of ignorance saw the sun only as a big red ball in the sky ?
What apology have they to offer me for depriving me of the Sun-
day education that I might have had, but which they hindered me
from getting because their light was darkness ? Not until I went
back to my native land as a foreigner and a stranger did I have an
opportunity to visit the British Museum or the National Gallery,
because when I was a youth in England, these and all similar
"places of culture" were closed on Sunday, and I could not visit
them on any other day. The same spirit that shut up them closes
the World's Fair too, against the working men. Meantime, I send
my greeting across the sea to Saint Museum's day.
M. M. Trumbull.
COSMOTHEOS.
BY CHARLES A. LANE.
Who treads the earth, and deemeth Matter base.
Kens not the kindredship of mysteries,
Nor openeth the spirit, vision-wise.
Behind the sense, to watch the Wonder's ways
That slips from clay to soul, with subtle grace.
Through all the scale of mutabilities,
A very god for marvel to the eyes.
Normal in change, inscrutable of face.
Lo, every touch that feeleth Force refuse
The formless infinite beyond saith : God !
And dull the ear that doth the echo lose.
Where, 'neath the feet, God soundeth in the sod :
Not Ymer slain ; but Life that aye unfurls
In dreams whose substance is the mazy worlds.
BOOK REVIEWS.
Inquirendo Island. By Hudor Genone. Third Edition. Chicago
:
Charles H. Kerr & Company.
The Last Tenet Imposed Upon the Khan of Tomathoz. By
Hudor Genone. Chicago : Charles H. Kerr & Company.
The first novel, "Inquirendo Island," presents to the readers
many valuable ideas in the shape of an allegory pleasantly told.
Mr. Hudor Genone is known to our readers by several thoughtful
contributions, and we recommend the present volume as being in
the same style. It caricatures the dogmatism of church-life, but
it suggests at the same time the religious truth that lies hidden in
the symbols of ceremonies and rituals.
The second novel by the same author will prove more inter-
esting still. The burlesque pencil sketches which illustrate the
various comical situations adorn the book and are no small incita-
tion to read the story. f.
Within Royal Palaces. Scenes Behind the Thrones. By Mar-
quise de Fontenoy. Philadelphia and St. Louis : Hubbard
Publishing Co.
An interesting book, full of information concerning the royal
families of Europe. The editor Mr. Fletcher Johnson, an Ameri-
can journalist of repute, has enjoyed the personal acquaintance of
the authoress for many years. The Marquise de Fontenoy appears
to be well fitted to the task she has undertaken, not only because she
belongs by birth and marriage to the aristocratic coteries and is
admitted to court, but also because she has a talent of telling well
what she knows. She places before us the occupants of the thrones
and those that stand nearest them, so that we can conceive a clear
idea of their characters, their speech, their faces, their habits,
their virtues, and their shortcomings. The book is richly illus-
trated and tastily bound. f.
NOTES.
The Open Court Publishing Co., will publish in a few days,
for the Christmas market, a tastily bound booklet by the editor
under the title "Truth in Fiction, Twelve Tales with a Moral."
Some of the tales are entirely new, while others have already ap-
peared in The Open Court, among which we mention "The Gar-
dener of Galilee," "Capital and Labor," "After the Distribution
of the Type.."
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